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A population of players repeatedly plays an n strategy
symmetric game.  Players update their strategies by sampling the
behavior of k opponents and playing a best response to the
distribution of strategies in the sample.  Suppose the game
possesses a      
1
k -dominant  strategy  which is initially played by a
positive fraction of the population.  Then if the population size
is large enough, play converges to the      
1
k -dominant  equilibrium
with arbitrarily high probability.
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1.  Introduction
  Multiplicity of equilibria creates fundamental difficulties for predicting behavior
in non-cooperative games.  These difficulties are most conspicuous in coordination
games.  Since strict equilibria satisfy virtually all equilibrium refinements proposed
in the literature, games with multiple strict equilibria do not admit a single,
obviously correct prediction of play.
 In  this  paper,  we  address  this issue using a simple evolutionary model.  In our
model, a fixed population of players repeatedly plays an n strategy symmetric game,
G.  Players myopically adjust their strategy choices in response to their opponents'
current behavior.
   Many  models  of evolution assume that players know the current population
state when deciding how to act.  However, one might expect precise information
about the population's behavior to be difficult or costly to obtain.  For this reason, it
seems more consistent with the assumption of myopia to have players base their
decisions on limited information about opponents' play.  To capture this notion as
simply as possible, we assume that when a player receives an opportunity to update
his behavior, he draws a sample of k  ³ 2 players from the population.  He then
chooses a best response to the distribution of behavior within his sample, viewing it
as representative of the behavior of the population as a whole.
   Surprisingly, this model can generate unique predictions of play, even in games
with multiple strict equilibria.  Suppose that G has a      
1
k -dominant  strategy which is
initially played by a positive fraction of the population.  We establish that if the
population size is large enough, play converges to the      
1
k -dominant equilibrium with
arbitrarily high probability.  Thus, in some coordination games, when players have
limited information about opponents' behavior, almost global convergence to a
single equilibrium is virtually guaranteed.
 Our  model  does  not  offer  a  unique prediction of play in every coordination
game: in generic 2 x 2 games, a unique prediction is guaranteed only if the sample
size is two.  Still, it seems natural to assume that the sample size k is small; while
this does not ensure a unique prediction in every game, it does create unique
predictions for many games.  Moreover, our conclusions for games which do
possess a      
1
k -dominant equilibrium are quite strong:  populations learn to play the
predicted equilibrium from nearly all initial conditions, even when other strict
equilibria are available.–2–
 To  shed  more  light  on  our  conclusions,  we  find  it  useful  to  contrast  them with
those that have been obtained using models of stochastic stability (e.g., Kandori,
Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Young (1993a)).  These models introduce rare
mutations to some underlying evolutionary process in order to establish the
existence of a unique stochastically stable equilibrium.  By definition, such an
equilibrium is very likely to be played by the population in the sufficiently distant
future.
 The  uniqueness  of  the  stochastically  stable prediction relies on the ergodicity of
the perturbed evolutionary process.  Unfortunately, ergodicity brings with it the
undesirable consequence that the predicted equilibrium is played and then
abandoned an infinite number of times.  In addition, if a strict equilibrium which is
not stochastically stable is reached first, this equilibrium should be expected to
persist; in some specifications, the expected amount of time before the equilibrium
is departed grows exponentially in the population size.
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 In  our  model,  convergence  occurs  with  high  probability from nearly all initial
conditions; becoming stuck at the wrong equilibrium is much less of an issue.
Convergence is also permanent:  once the population reaches the      
1
k -dominant
equilibrium, it never departs.  Finally, while the large population sizes which are
natural to consider in evolutionary contexts can create tensions within stochastic
stability models, they make our results easier to prove.  However, we shall see that
our conclusions are not dependent on having a very large population:  the
predictions of our model still have force when the population is moderate in size.
2.  The Theorem
Let G = 




n {} { } {} == 11 , p  be an n strategy symmetric game.  If D denotes the simplex
in R
n, then each pi: D ® R represents the payoffs to strategy si as a function of the
proportion of players choosing each strategy.  Following Morris, Rob, and Shin
(1995), we say that strategy si is p-dominant if pi(x) > pj(x) for all j ¹ i whenever x Î D
satisfies xi ³ p.  Thus, a strategy is p-dominant if it is the unique best response when
it is played by at least proportion p of the population.  Observe that increasing p
makes  p-dominance  less demanding:  if p < q, any p-dominant  strategy is also q-
dominant.  
                                                
1   See, for example, Ellison (1993).–3–
 The  standard  evolutionary framework considers populations of players who are
repeatedly randomly matched to play a normal form game.  In the current context,
this corresponds to the case in which each pi is linear:  pi(x) º (Px)i for some  payoff
matrix P Î       R
nn ´ .
2  We call a normal form game an n x n coordination  game if each
of the n strategies constitutes a strict equilibrium of the game:  that is, if Pii > Pji for
all i and all j ¹ i.  A   
1
2 -dominant strategy of a 2 x 2 coordination game is called strictly
risk dominant; such a strategy is a strict best response against an opponent who is
equally likely to play either strategy.
 Our  results  will  concern  games  with       
1
k -dominant  strategies, where k  ³ 2 is an
integer.  For examples of these games, consider the class of n x n pure  coordination
games, which satisfy Pii > 0 for all i and Pij = 0 for all pairs ij with i ¹ j.  Suppose that
P11 = c and that Pii Î (0, 1] for all i ¹ 1.  Then it is easily verified that strategy s1 is      
1
k -
dominant whenever c > k – 1.  If in addition Pii = 1 for some i ¹ 1, the converse
statement also holds.
 We  model  the  evolution  of  play  as  a  Markov  process.  The game G is played
repeatedly by a population of N players.  The random vector    Xt





represents the number of players choosing strategies s1 through sn at times t = 0, 1, … ;
by definition,       Xt
Ni
i
, å  = N at all times t.  The initial condition       X
N
0  Î          N0
n is given.
During each period, one player is chosen at random from the population and given
the opportunity to revise his strategy choice.
3
 In  many  models  of  evolution  (e.g.,  Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993)), it is
assumed that the player granted the revision opportunity learns the exact
distribution of strategies in the population and plays a best response to this
distribution.  Under this specification, there is an absorbing state with a non-
negligible basin of attraction corresponding to each strict equilibrium of the game.
    In  many  settings  where  evolutionary models are appropriate, it may be more
natural to assume that players have limited information about opponents'
behavior.  To capture this, we suppose that the player who receives the revision
opportunity randomly samples k ³ 2 players from the population and learns their
                                                
2   In  making  this  comparison  with  normal  form games we implicitly assume that  players can be
randomly matched against themselves.   When the population size is large, the effect of forbidding
self-matching become negligible; hence, ruling out self-matching would not alter our main result.
3 All  of  our  results  would continue to hold if players' revision opportunities instead arrived via
independent Poisson processes.–4–
behavior.  He then plays a best response to the distribution of strategies in the
sample.
4
   Clearly, all  strict equilibria  of  G correspond to absorbing states of this Markov
process.  But because of the randomness  in the sampling procedure, the population
can converge to any of these absorbing states from any interior initial condition.
Nevertheless, we are able to show that if one equilibrium is      
1
k -dominant, a large
population is nearly certain to converge to it from nearly all initial conditions.
We call strategy si  asymptotically almost globally stable if for all d > 0,
 




Ni Ni PX N XN
®¥ ®¥ =³ () 0 d  = 1.
In words:  si is asymptotically almost globally stable if for any positive d and e , there
exists an N = N(d, e) with the following property:  if the population size exceeds N
and at least proportion d of the population initially plays si, then the probability that
play converges to the state in which all players choose si exceeds 1 – e.
We are now able to state our main result.
Theorem:  If si is      
1
k -dominant, it is asymptotically almost globally stable.
Corollary 1:  If k = 2, G is a 2 x 2 coordination game,  and si is strictly risk dominant,
then si is asymptotically almost globally stable.
 We  first  offer  intuition  for  the  case  in  which  G has exactly two strategies:  s1,
which is      
1
k -dominant,  and s2, which is also a strict equilibrium.  Suppose that the
current proportion of s1 players is x.  Let D(x) be the draw rate for strategy s1:  the
probability that the player who is given the opportunity to switch strategies is an s1
player.  Clearly, D(x) = x.  Similarly, let C(x) be the choice rate for strategy s1:  the
probability that the player given the chance to switch chooses strategy s1.  Since s1 is
     
1
k -dominant, and since the sample size is k, strategy s2 will only be chosen when all
                                                
4   For simplicity, we assume that samples are drawn with replacement; allowing sampling without
replacement would not alter our main result.  In the event that a player has multiple best responses to a
particular sample, his behavior can be specified arbitrarily.
  Models of evolution with  incomplete sampling have also been considered by Young (1993a, 1993b),
Hurkens (1995), Kaniovski and Young (1995), and Sáez-Martí  and Weibull (1999).  In these models,
players choose best responses to an incomplete memory of past play rather than an incomplete sample
of current behavior.–5–
k players queried choose s2.  Therefore, the probability that s1 is chosen is C(x) = 1 – (1
– x)
k.  We can compute the expected change in the number of s1 players as
 (1  –  D(x))C(x) – D(x)(1 – C(x)) = C(x) – D(x) = (1 – x) – (1 – x)
k,
which is strictly positive whenever x Î (0, 1).
5  Therefore, whenever the population
is not at an absorbing state, the expected change in the number of s1 players is
positive.  But when the population size is sufficiently large, the course of evolution
is almost completely governed by the expected direction of motion.  We are
therefore able to show that for any positive initial proportion of s1 players, if the
population size is large enough, convergence to the state in which all players choose
s1 is virtually guaranteed.
  Now suppose there are more than two strategies, but that s1 is still      
1
k -dominant.
While the draw rate is unchanged, the choice rate can now depend on the
distribution of behavior among strategies besides s1.  However, since s1 is      
1
k -
dominant, the choice rate must be at least 1 – (1 – x)
k.  Thus, the expected change in
the number of s1 players remains positive.  We can therefore still establish




  Our definition of stability contains a limit in the population size N.  This allows
us to consider arbitrarily large populations when establishing convergence
probabilities close to 1.  How large a population do we actually need?  To address this
question, we let si be a      
1
k -dominant strategy, and define the population bound    N by
      N(,) de = min{M : " N ³ M, 





®¥ =³ () 0 d  > 1 – e}.
Suppose that at the onset of play, at least proportion d of the population plays
strategy si.  Then if the population size is at least       N(,) de, convergence to the      
1
k -
dominant equilibrium will occur with a probability of at least 1 – e.
   We now show that this bound grows slowly as d and e become small.
                                                
5   That C(x) ³ D(x) is observed  by Chu (1993) in an evolutionary  model of law enforcement.
6   It  is  worth  noting  that  when  k = 1, evolution is essentially random.  For example, when G is a
coordination game, the draw and choice rates for each strategy are always equal, and each component
of the evolutionary process is a martingale.–6–
Corollary 2:  The population bound       N(,) de satisfies
      N(,) de £ 


















Thus, for each fixed e,       N(,) de Î       O(l n) dd
-- 11 , and for each fixed d,       N(,) de Î       O(ln ) e
-1 .
Corollary 2 shows that the population sizes needed for our predictions to be
relevant are not large, even if few players initially choose the      
1
k -dominant  strategy,
and even if we demand a probability of convergence very close to 1.  In particular, as
we lower the probability e of a failure to converge, the bound    N only grows as the
logarithm of    e
-1:  small populations can learn to play the      
1
k -dominant  equilibrium
with very high probabilities.
 The  proof  of  these  results  implicitly  defines  an  algorithm  for  computing
convergence probabilities, the running time of which is linear in the population
size.  Using this algorithm, we can determine exact population bounds       N(,) de for
specific choices of d and e.  In Table 1, we present bounds for the case in which k = 2;
these bounds are valid when the game G has a   
1
2 -dominant equilibrium and the
sample size is 2.  The  population  sizes needed to ensure convergence to the   
1
2 -
dominant equilibrium are quite small.  For example, if at least 5% of the population
initially chooses the   
1
2 -dominant  strategy, the probability of a failure to converge to
the   
1
2 -dominant equilibrium is less than one in a million whenever the population
size is at least 381.
  Table 2 contains population bounds for the case in which k = 5, which are valid
when the game G has a   
1
5 -dominant equilibrium and the sample size is 5.  Fewer
games have   
1
5 -dominant equilibria than have   
1
2 -dominant  equilibria.  But in those
which do, convergence to the equilibrium is robust to larger sample sizes.
Moreover, as the tables illustrate, the larger samples allow us to guarantee
convergence to the equilibrium in smaller populations.
7
                                                
7   That most of the numbers in the tables have last digit 1 is a consequence of the discreteness of the
state space. For example, if N = 100, there is a state at which exactly 10% of the population plays
strategy  s1, while if N = 101, all states at which at least 10% play s1 actually have at least 11/101 »
10.89% playing s1.  For this reason, when d = .10 the probabilities of failures to converge drop discretely
after each multiple of 10, leading the population bounds to occur at these points.–7–
e
   10
1 -
   10
2 -
   10
4 -
   10
6 -
   10
8 -
. 2 5 92 14 56 99 3
d .10 31 61 121 191 251
.05 61 121 241 381 521
.01 301 601 1301 1901 2601
Table 1:  Population bounds       N(,) de when k = 2.
e
   10
1 -
   10
2 -
   10
4 -
   10
6 -
   10
8 -
.25 5 9 17 29 33
d .10 11 21 51 71 101
.05 21 41 101 161 221
.01 101 201 501 801 1101
Table 2:  Population bounds       N(,) de when k = 5.
3.  The Proof
 As  above,  we  begin  with  the  case in which G has exactly two strategies:  a      
1
k -
dominant  strategy s1, and a strict equilibrium strategy s2.  We find it convenient to
speak in terms of the number of players who are not playing the risk dominant
strategy:  define    Y t
N º       Xt
N,2 to be the number of players choosing strategy s2.  Let Z
N =





Markov chain on Z
N whose only absorbing states are 0 and N.  We want to show that
   Y t
N is absorbed at state 0 with high probability.
For the number of players choosing strategy s2 to increase, the player who is
given the opportunity to switch strategies must initially be playing s1, and he must
draw a sample which consists solely of s2 players.  Hence, for z Î {0,      
1
N , … , 1},





N () + =+ = 1 1  = (1 – z) z
k º p(z).
Similarly,  for    Y t
N to fall, the player given the chance to switch must  be playing s2,
and his sample must contain at least one player choosing s1.  Therefore,–8–





N () + =- = 1 1  = z (1 – z
k) º q(z).
  We now define three functions which will prove useful.  Define r: (0, 1) ® R by
  r(z) = 





























å  = 












Since k ³ 2, r(·) is decreasing and 





r  = k.  Next, for m Î {1, … , N – 1} define
  p
N(m) = 











N(·) is increasing in m.  Finally, for y Î Z
N define
 




































N(·) is strictly increasing.
 A  standard  result  on  birth  and  death  chains  (Durrett  (1991,  Theorem  5.3.7))  tells
us that if       Y
N
0  = y , the probability that    Y t
N converges to N is equal to f
N(y)/f
N(N).  It
will prove useful later on to see why this is so.  The function f
N(·) was constructed in
such a way that       f
N
t
N Y ()  is a martingale:  0 and N are absorbing states of    Y t
N, and it is
easily checked that for all y Î {1, … , N – 1},
  f
N(y)= 
     









N () ++- () - () () + () - ff f () ( ) () 11 1 (1)
 = 






N f + () = () 1
= 






NN ff f + ()() = () 1 () .
Let T0 and TN be the (random) times that    Y t
N hits 0 and N respectively, and let T =
min(T0, TN).  Since       f
N
t
N Y ()  is bounded and T is almost surely finite, the Optional
Stopping Theorem (Durrett (1991, Theorem 4.7.4)) tells us that
f
N(y) = 




NN f () = () 0  = f
N(N)       PT T N () < 0 .–9–
Rearranging this equation yields the desired result.
 Fix  d, e > 0.  It is enough to show that if y £ N(1 – d) and
  N ³ 




















N(N) < e.  Define
     ya
N = max{y Î Z
N: y £ N(1 – d)};
   yb
N = min{y Î Z
N: y ³ N(1 –   
d
2 )}.
Observe that    yb
N < N(1 –   
d
2 ) + 1 < N(1 –   
d
4 ).  Hence,
 








     
N
NN -- + - (( ) ) 11 1 2
d  = 
     
1
2
2 d - N
 = 
     
2






Furthermore, since r(·) is decreasing and 





r  = k, we see that
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N(·) is increasing and positive and since p
N(·) is increasing,
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ø ÷ = e.
This completes the proof of the case in which G is a two strategy coordination game.
 We  now  consider  the  general  case.  Suppose that strategy s1 is      
1
k -dominant, and
let       
ˆ Y t
N º N –       Xt
N,1 be the number of players who are playing strategies other than s1–10–
at time t.  Since s1 is a strict equilibrium, it is clear that 0 is an absorbing state of      
ˆ Y t
N,
and that no state in {1, … , N – 1} is absorbing.  We  need to show that      
ˆ Y t
N is absorbed
at 0 with high probability.
 It  is  worth  noting  as  an  aside that      
ˆ Y t
N need not be a Markov chain.  The
probability that a player's sample causes him to switch to s1 can depend on the
distribution of the population's behavior among strategies besides s1.  Past values of
     
ˆ Y t
N can contain information about this distribution for which the current value of
     
ˆ Y t
N is not a sufficient statistic.  Therefore, transition probabilities for      
ˆ Y t
N that
condition only on the value of      
ˆ Y t
N in the current period will typically differ from
transition probabilities which also condition on the values in past periods.
  To prove the result, we will establish that       f
N
t
N Y ( ˆ ) is a supermartingale.  We can
then define      
ˆ T0 and      
ˆ TN to be the times that      
ˆ Y t
N hits 0 and N and let      ˆ T = min(     
ˆ T0,      
ˆ TN).
Then applying the Optional Stopping Theorem yields
  f
N(y) ³ 





ˆ () = () 0  = f
N(N)       PT T N ( ˆˆ ) < 0 .
Thus,       PT T N ( ˆˆ ) < 0  £ f
N(y)/ f
N(N), and the result follows from the analysis above.
 To  show  that        f
N
t
N Y ( ˆ ) is a supermartingale, we first observe that since strategy s1
is      
1
k -dominant, a player given the chance to switch strategies will choose to play s1 if
at least one member of his sample plays s1.  (He may also choose s1 even if no one in
his sample chooses s1; whether he does so depends on the how the members of his
sample are distributed among the other strategies.)  In any case, it is clear that if z Î
{0,      
1
N , … , 1},
        ˆ () pz t  º 
     





N ( ˆˆ ˆ ) + =+ = 1 1  £ (1 – z) z
k = p(z).
Similarly, a player will certainly choose s1 if his sample contains at least one player
playing s1.  Therefore,
        ˆ () qz t  º 
     





N ( ˆˆ ˆ ) + =- = 1 1  ³ z (1 – z
k) º q(z).
Thus, applying equation (1) and utilizing the fact that f
N(·) is strictly increasing, we
find that if y Î {1, … , N – 1},
f
N(y)= 
     









N () ++- () - () () + () - ff f () ( ) () 11 1–11–
³ 
     











N () ++-() - () () + () - ff f 11 1
³ 
     













N () ++-() - () () + () - ff f 11 1
= 







+ () = () 1
= 






NN ff f ˆˆ() + ()() = () 1 .
In addition, since      
ˆ Y t
N can never exceed N,
 






NN ff f ˆˆ() + ()() = () 1  £ f
N(N),










NN ff f ˆˆ() + ()() = () 1 0  = f
N(0).
This establishes that       f
N
t
N Y ( ˆ ) is a supermartingale,  completing  the proof of the
theorem.–12–
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